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Abstract
Power companies such as Southern California Edi-
son (SCE) uses Demand Response (DR) contracts
to incentivize consumers to reduce their power con-
sumption during periods when demand forecast ex-
ceeds supply. Current mechanisms in use offer con-
tracts to consumers independent of one another, do
not take into consideration consumers’ heterogene-
ity in consumption profile or reliability, and fail to
achieve high participation.
We introduce DR-VCG, a new DR mechanism that
offers a flexible set of contracts (which may include
the standard SCE contracts) and uses VCG pricing.
We prove that DR-VCG elicits truthful bids, incen-
tivizes honest preparation efforts, enables efficient
computation of allocation and prices. With sim-
ple fixed-penalty contracts, the optimization goal
of the mechanism is an upper bound on probability
that the reduction target is missed. Extensive sim-
ulations show that compared to the current mech-
anism deployed in by SCE, the DR-VCG mecha-
nism achieves higher participation, increased relia-
bility, and significantly reduced total expenses.
1 Introduction
Power system operation involves many challenges, driven by
the requirement that supply equals demand at all times. Too
much supply may lead to overload on the grid, whereas ex-
cessive demand may lead to shortages and blackouts. The
problem is aggravated by the fact that consumption tends to
vary sharply due to certain events (for example, surges in con-
sumption during heatwaves), whereas increasing the supply is
typically slow and costly. Even if the power company wants
to shift some of the demand to a different time, it cannot co-
erce the consumers to do so, and may only affect their be-
havior by using monetary incentives, such as increasing elec-
tricity price during peak-demand times. As in other markets,
consumers may respond to incentives in different ways based
on their own preferences. Unlike some other markets, the se-
rious consequences of failure to meet demand, and the large
uncertainty about how consumers may react to incentives, re-
quires the power company to guarantee there is enough slack
on the supply side.
The DR-SCE mechanism Demand Response (DR) pro-
grams are used by power companies to handle surges in de-
mand by reducing consumption rather than increasing pro-
duction. Typically, when a surge is predicted one day ahead
of time, the company lets consumers bid on how much con-
sumption they can reduce. Each consumer is being paid
a fixed $0.5 per reduced kWh, but only if the reduced con-
sumption is between 50% and 150% of her bid. We call this
system the DR-SCE mechanism, as it is used by Southern Cal-
ifornia Edison (c.f. [Patterson et al., 2014]) (as well as other
companies such as PG&E [Hansen et al., 2014]).
DR-SCE has several shortcomings: incentives for partici-
pation are often insufficient (only 12% of registered partic-
ipants in 2012-2013 submitted any bids), the system does
not capture the very different consumption profiles of con-
sumers, and does not filter out unreliable bidders. Yet, being
a widely deployed DR system, we treat DR-SCE both as a
starting point and as a benchmark for new mechanisms.
Contribution We propose a novel DR-VCG mechanism
for selecting and incentivizing a subset of consumers to re-
duce consumption. The grid offers a set of contracts defined
by some desired reduction target and a penalty scheme, and
agents may bid how much they want to get paid on for ac-
cepting each contract. The mechanism then selects a subset
of contracts that minimizes the sum of bids, and applies VCG
prices to pay the agents. As a result, it is a dominant strategy
for all agents to bid their true costs.
We show that for natural penalty schemes, the sum of bids
is a good proxy for the reliability of the joint contract, as
high bids are indicative of low individual reliability. We show
that the current contracts used by SCE and PG&E can still
be offered under DR-VCG (to allow for easy transition and
backward-compatibility). We demonstrate via examples and
simulations that even when restricted to offering SCE-like
contracts, DR-VCG dominates DR-SCE in terms of reliabil-
ity and grid expense.
This is the full version of a paper accepted to IJCAI-
2017 [Meir et al., 2017]. All omitted proofs are available
on Appendix B.
Related Work A number of recent works have discussed
how groups of agents can be coordinated and incentivized to
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
07
30
0v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
0 M
ay
 20
17
shift power demand [Haring et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2015;
Su et al., 2014]. Considering strategic agents, [Rose et al.,
2012] and [Akasiadis and Chalkiadakis, 2013] propose the
use of scoring rules to incentivize truthful reports about ex-
pected future generation or consumption. However, scoring
rule approaches are not concerned with selection of agents
to satisfy a system-wide reliability constraint. [Li et al.,
2015] consider agents bidding using supply curves, and study
the market equilibria for this setting. They do not, how-
ever take a mechanism design perspective or try to guarantee
truthfulness. Mechanism design approaches for aggregating
load apply either variations of VCG [Samadi et al., 2012;
Chapman and Verbic, 2017], or a new “staggered clock-
proxy” auction [Nekouei et al., 2015]. Neither work con-
siders the crucial issue of reliability, i.e. in practice not all
agents selected to respond will do so. A different variation
of VCG pricing was used by [Porter et al., 2008] to align
the incentives of agent in face of possible failures in gen-
eral mechanisms. However their version requires full reve-
lation (which is problematic in practical DR programs), and
is aimed at maximizing social welfare rather than reliability.
The work closest to ours is [Ma et al., 2016], who propose
a mechanism that allows agents to bid on the maximal penalty
for failing the DR contract, while [Ma et al., 2017] extend this
work to include uncertainty about costs. Our work takes a dif-
ferent approach, which generalizes currently used contracts
and, in our view, is more geared to practical applications.
2 Model
We consider a single power utility or system operator (hence-
forth, the grid), and a setN of consumers (or agents) who are
registered to a demand response program.
The most important task of the grid is to cut down con-
sumption by at least M energy units (say, kWh) during the
DR event. Given that this target is met, the grid would like
to minimize payments to the agents. The baseline consump-
tion profile of each agent is assumed known from past con-
sumption data, so the grid can measure how much each agent
reduced in practice.
2.1 Contracts
A contract in our model is defined by a pair (`, F ), where `
is a commitment goal in energy units and F : N → R+ is
a penalty function, mapping the realized energy reduction X
to a monetary penalty F (X). A-priori, F is unconstrained,
and ` is merely a non-binding declaration of the agent’s in-
tentions. It makes sense to consider more specific classes of
penalties that attach the penalty to the commitment goal.
Fixed contracts A Fixed penalty contract is defined by a
pair (`, f`), and the penalty is set to F (X) = f` if X <
` and 0 otherwise. In other words, the agent commits to
reduce `, or otherwise pay a penalty of f`. See Fig. 1(a).
Cliff contracts A Cliff penalty contract is defined by a tuple
(`, f`, α, β) where α < 1, β > 0, f` ≥ `(1 − α)β. It has
the following form:
F (X) =
{
f`, X < α · `
(`−X)β, α · ` ≤ X < `
0, ` ≤ X
0 `
−f`
0
(a)
0 α` `
−f`
0
(b)
0 `
0
(c)
Figure 1: The penalty−F as a function of the realized reduc-
tion X under a Fixed contract (a), a Cliff contract (b) and a
general contract (c).
We can think of a Cliff penalty function as a plateau where
the penalty is 0 whenever the commitment ` is met. Failure
to meet the goal results in a linear penalty, where beyond a
certain point the penalty becomes a constant, and the utility
drops sharply (hence a “cliff”). See Fig. 1(b).
Clearly any Fixed contract is a Cliff contract. As we will
later see, the SCE payment scheme can be implemented as a
particular Cliff penalty scheme, so even restricting our mech-
anism to using Cliff contracts is sufficient to generalize the
SCE system.
Optimal contract sets For what follows, we assume no
structural restriction on contracts or penalty schemes. We
simply assume that a set of k contracts J are offered, and
F (j,X) is the penalty for an agent who signs up for con-
tract j ∈ J and reduces consumption by X . Since the value
of a contract to an agent is always non-positive, denote by
Bij ≥ 0 the bid of agent i on contract j.1 Then for a sub-
set of contracts S ⊆ N × J , we denote the sum of bids by
SB(S) =
∑
(i,j)∈S Bij .
In addition, the grid may pose a restriction on which sets of
contracts are valid: we denote by S all valid sets of contracts.
In this work, we use this constraint to impose a lower bound
on (declared) reduction in consumption, thus
S(M) = {S :
∑
(i,j)∈S
`j ≥M and ∀i|{(i, j) ∈ S}| ≤ 1}.
In other words, S(M) includes all sets of contracts that claim
to reduce at least M units of consumption, and each agent
has at most one contract. For an agent i ∈ N , we denote
SB−i(S) =
∑
(i′,j)∈S:i′ 6=iBi′j , that is, the sum of bids over
all agents in S except i. We sometimes denote i ∈ S as a
selected agent (meaning there is some j s.t. (i, j) ∈ S).
An optimal contract set is a set of individual contracts that
minimizes the sum of bids, i.e. argminS∈S SB(S).
2.2 The DR-VCG Mechanism
We define the DR-VCG mechanism, for assigning demand
response contracts using Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) pay-
ments. The grid publishes a finite set of contracts J .2 Each
agent i submits a single bid Bij on each contract j. For now,
1The bid is supposed to reflect the various costs involved in tak-
ing the contract: preparation cost, online adjustment costs, the ex-
pected penalty and so on. We elaborate on this in the next section.
2The analysis works also for a variant of the mechanism where
agents may propose new contracts. See Appendix A.
we can think ofBij as some proxy of the cost required from i
when taking on contract j. The mechanism finds the optimal
valid set of contracts by solving minS∈S SB(S).
For a set of agents N , a set of contracts J , and a reduction
goal M , we can plug in our more specific optimization goal
and constraints. We get the optimal subset of contracts as
S∗(N, J,M) = argminS∈S(M){
∑
(i,j)∈S
Bij}.
We denote SB∗(N, J,M) = SB(S∗(N, J,M)), and omit
some of the parameters when they are clear from the con-
text. Then, for each selected agent i ∈ S∗, the individual
rewards are computed as the VCG payments with the Clarke
pivot rule [Clarke, 1971]. Informally, the sum of bids is ana-
log of the social cost, and the VCG payment is the positive
externality the agent’s presence has on the rest of the agents.
Formally, for each i ∈ N ,
ri = SB
∗(N−i, J)− SB∗−i(N, J).
The reward is paid to the agent up front, regardless of how
much reduction it eventually achieves in practice.
Finally, for each (i, j) ∈ S∗(N, J), the selected agent i
pays F (j,Xi) to the grid, where each Xi is the realized re-
duction of agent i. The utility of agent i depends on the re-
ward, the penalty, and the investment costs required to meet
the contract. We analyze agents’ incentives and utilities in the
next section.
Example 1 (Running example). Suppose we apply the DR-
VCG mechanism with a single fixed contract (` = 100, f` =
50). There are three agents that submit bids of B1 = 0, B2 =
5, B3 = 15, and the goal for the grid is set to M = 200.
The optimal set of contracts that meets M = 200 is S∗ =
{1, 2} with SB∗ = 5. The rewards are:
r1 = SB
∗({2, 3})−SB∗−1({1, 2})=20−5=15; r2=15−0=15,
so in total the grid pays 30 (some of which it might get back
as penalties).
3 Analysis
Complexity In order to run the DR-VCG mechanism, we
should be able to efficiently compute the optimal contract set
and prices. Suppose that energy units (including the reduction
goal M ) are integers.
Theorem 1. For any sets of agents N and Cliff contracts J ,
both of S∗(N, J) and SB∗(N, J) (and thus also VCG prices)
can be computed in time polynomial in n, k,M .
In the general case, finding an optimal set of contracts is
NP-hard even for fixed contracts, by a reduction from the
Knapsack problem [Karp, 1972] (details omitted).
However, the knapsack problem is solvable by dynamic
programming when the units are bounded integers, and a
similar algorithm can be applied to our problem (intuitively,
compute dynamically the optimal contract sets for agents
{1, . . . , i} for i = 1, 2, . . . , n). Hence we get Theorem 1.
3.1 Incentives
To make things concrete we will describe a particular prob-
abilistic model from which we can derive agents’ costs, and
will show how under this model the incentives of the agents
align nicely with those of the grid. However the claim the
agents’ dominant strategy is to reveal their true costs does not
depend on this interpretation, and holds whenever agents can
attribute a well-defined cost to each contract.
Effort and types In general, agents do not know with cer-
tainty the amount of energy they will be able to reduce, as
this depends on some unknown factors such as urgent service
orders, last minute clients and so on. Moreover, preparation
may have some cost (e.g. due to changing the work schedule,
or turning down orders). By investing a higher effort/cost, an
agent might be able to commit to saving more energy.
The type of each agent i is given by a distribution pi.
In detail, pi(c,X) is the probability that by investing c,
agent i will reduce exactly X units of consumption (thus∑
X≥0 pi(c,X) = 1 for all c).
3 We assume agents are al-
ways trying to maximize their utility.
A straightforward approach would be to ask agents to re-
port their types (and then apply some version of VCG). How-
ever, a language to report an arbitrary distribution may be
very complicated. Further, unsophisticated agents like small
households may not know their own distribution (or even
what is a distribution). Fortunately, our DR-VCG does not
require the agents to report any such distribution.
Fix an agent i who accepted a contract j (with penalty
scheme F ) and gets paid reward ri. If she decides to in-
vest c, she will pay an expected penalty of EFi(j, c) =
EX∼pi(c)[F (j,X)], and her expected utility would be:
ui(j, c) = ri− c−EFi(j, ci) = ri− c−EX∼pi(c)[F (j,X)].
Therefore, the optimal investment an utility maximizing agent
should make for contract j should be
c∗i (j) = argmaxui(j, c) = argminc≥0(c+ EFi(j, c)).
In words, when agent i is signed up for contract j, invest-
ing c∗i (j) will minimize her total cost (investment + penalty).
We denote this cost by C∗i (j) = c
∗
i (j) + EFi(j, c
∗
i (j)) =
minc≥0(c+EFi(j, c)). We refer to C∗i : J → R+ as the cost
type of agent i, which is derived from her type pi and F .
The total expense (TE) of the mechanism can be computed
as the sum of rewards paid to the agents minus expected
penalties: TE(S) =
∑
(i,j)∈S(ri − EFi(j, c∗i (j)) (assum-
ing agents invest optimally).
A mechanism is truthful if it is a dominant strategy for any
agent i to report her true cost C∗i (j) on any contract j.
A mechanism is individually rational (IR) if for every pair
(i, j) selected by the mechanism, ui(j, c∗i (j)) ≥ 0 (that is, by
participating each agent does not lose in expectation).
Theorem 2. Consider DR-VCG with arbitrary N, J,M .
1. For every contract j ∈ J , it is a dominant strategy for
agent i to bid Bij = C∗i (j);
3Investment c may include preparation costs, on-line actions re-
quired to produce the energy cut X , opportunity cost, and so on.
2. If contract (i, j) is selected, it is a dominant strategy for
i to invest c∗i (j);
3. The mechanism is IR.
Proof sketch. Intuitively, we show that VCG payments are
market clearing (following similar proofs in other domains,
see [Nisan, 2007]), i.e. that no agent prefers a different con-
tract (or no contract) under the given prices . Since the prices
that agent i faces are independent of her bids, it is a dominant
strategy to report truthfully. Once contract (i, j) is selected,
then ui(j, c) = ri− c−EFi(j, c). By definition, this is max-
imized by investing c∗i (j).
Example 2. Consider three agents, where each one can re-
duce consumption by 100 kWh without effort. However,
agents have different reliability and only manage to hold their
commitment with a probability pi of 1, 0.9, and 0.7, respec-
tively (and otherwise reduce 0). Suppose that the goal of the
grid is M = 200 kWh.
Consider the DR-VCG mechanism with a single fixed con-
tract (` = 100, f` = 50). Since agent 1 always meets her
commitment, C∗1 = 0. For the others, C
∗
2 = 0.1 · 50 = 5 (as
agent 2 fails w.p. 0.1), and C∗3 = 0.3 · 50 = 15, i.e. Bi = C∗i
are exactly the bids in Ex. 1. The selected set is S∗ = {1, 2}
(the DR-VCG mechanism filters out the least reliable agent).
The total expense of the grid is TEV CG = 30 − 5 = 25
(expected penalty of 5 from agent 2).
3.2 Fallback options and reserve costs
In general, the grid may not find enough agents to meet the
reduction goal M , and may thus need to use some fallback
option like a standby generator or emergency blackouts. For
every amount m we denote by Rm the cost for the grid of
using its fallback option to reduce consumption/increase pro-
duction by m units. E.g. if the total cost of demand re-
sponse contracts exceeds RM , then the power company is
better off without assigning any contracts, or the fallback op-
tions can be used to fill up some gap between
∑
(i,j)∈S∗ `j
and M . A fallback option can be simply added to the mech-
anism as a ‘virtual agent’ that bids Rm on the fixed contract
(` = m,F ≡ Rm). This is similar to the role of reserve
prices in auctions. The reserve costs guarantee that: (I) The
grid finds a cheap set of solutions, whether these solutions
are contracts with agents or external options; and (II) For any
(i, j), the reward is bounded: ri ≤ RM−L − RM−(L+`j)
where L =
∑
j′∈S∗\{j} `j′ .
4 Reliability and Expenses
The incentive analysis we presented goes through for any set
of contracts. Yet, the goal of the grid is to match demand
and supply, preferably at low total expenses, which is a-priori
not the same as minimizing the sum of bids. By restricting
DR-VCG to use structured constructs we can relate this goal.
We next analyze how the sum of bids relates to reliability,
i.e. the probability that the reduction target is met. A detailed
example comparing reliability and payments across mecha-
nisms is in Appendix C.
4.1 Fixed penalty contracts
Denote by P (S,m) the probability that a quantity of at least
m is reduced under contracts S. Then P ∗(N, J,M) =
P (S∗(N, J,M),M) is the reliability of the DR-VCG mech-
anism. We would like to measure or bound P
∗
(N, J,M) =
1 − P ∗(N, J,M), which is the probability that the mecha-
nism fails to meet the lower bound reduction M (we may
omit some of the parameters).
Proposition 3. Let J = {(`j , f)}j=1,2,... for some fixed f ,
then P
∗
(M) ≤ 1f SB∗(M). This bound is tight.
Proof. For any agent i that is assigned a contract j: The op-
timal investment is c∗i (j). The expected penalty is
EFi(j, c
∗
i (j)) = PrX∼pi(c∗i (j))[X < `j ] · f,
i.e., proportional to the probability it will undershoot the com-
mitment `j . The DR-VCG mechanism minimizes
SB(S) =
∑
(i,j)∈S
C∗i (j) =
∑
(i,j)∈S
c∗i (j) + f ·
∑
(i,j)∈S
Pr[Xi < `j ],
that is, a combination of the total investment and the sum of
individual failure probabilities. Note that∑
(i,j)∈S
Pr[Xi < `j ]
(a)
≥ Pr[∃(i, j) ∈ S s.t. Xi < `j ]
(b)
≥Pr[
∑
(i,j)∈S
Xi <
∑
(i,j)∈S
`j ]
(c)
≥ Pr[
∑
(i,j)∈S
Xi < M ].
Thus,
SB∗(M) ≥ f · Pr[
∑
(i,j)∈S∗(M)
Xi < M ] +
∑
(i,j)∈S∗(M)
c∗i (j)
= f · P ∗(M) +
∑
(i,j)∈S
c∗i (j)
(d)
≥ f · P ∗(M).
To see why the bound is tight, observe that the inequali-
ties in the proof are tight if (respectively): (a) failure events
are disjoint (i.e. maximally negatively correlated);(b) agents
never reduce more than `j ; (c) the reduction goal is met ex-
actly (
∑
`j =M ); and (d) investments are 0.
Thus a fixed penalty lets us bound the probability that the
grid fails (reduction goal is not met). As we increase f , the
(bound on) failure probability becomes smaller, at higher ex-
pense (due to higher bids). Of course, this is a worst-case
bound. If, for example, some agents exceed their commit-
ment then this would compensate for failures of others, and
will increase the probability that the reduction goalM is met.
In general the grid may set a higher goal M ′ = γM than
the expected surge M as a safety margin. Another result ties
this safety margin with the sum of bids.
Proposition 4. Suppose that there is a single Fixed contract
(1, f). Then M ′ − E[∑i∈S∗(M ′)Xi] ≤ 1f SB∗(M ′).
Thus if the grid sets M ′ s.t. M ′ − 1f SB∗(M ′) ≥M , then
actual reduction is at least M in expectation.
4.2 Cliff penalty contracts
We saw that having a constant penalty for a violation allows
us to bound the failure probability. A Cliff penalty is more
“forgiving,” yet it provides similar guarantees.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the set of possible contracts J is
composed of Cliff penalty contracts of the form (`j , f, α, βj)
for some fixed f and α (same for all contracts), then P (S, α ·
M) ≤ 1f SB(S). This bound is tight.
That is, we get a guarantee on the probability that we miss
the reduction goal by a factor of α (tightness is achieved if
either α = 1 or βj = 0 for all j). Note that this does not
require any assumption on the types of the agents. The grid
can then sign contracts that sum up to M ′ = Mα so as to
bound the probability of missing its actual goal M .
5 DR-SCE vs. DR-VCG
We argue that the DR-SCE mechanism can be simulated ex-
actly using a Cliff payment contract. Formally, in DR-SCE
and each agent submits a bid bi, and the grid selects agents at
random until
∑
bi ≥ M . After the reduction Xi is realized,
each selected agent gets a reward of ri = 0 if Xi < bi/2,
ri =
Xi
2 if Xi ∈ [bi/2, 3bi/2], and ri = 3bi/2 otherwise.
We argue that same SCE contracts used today can be of-
fered via the DR-VCG mechanism. For any ` > 0, we define
a Cliff contract j` = (`, f` = `2 , α =
1
3 , β =
1
2 ).
Proposition 6. For any agent i of type pi, submitting op-
timal bid bi to the DR-SCE mechanism is ex-post equiva-
lent to being the only bidder in DR-VCG with M ≥ bi,
JSCE= {j`}`≥0, and reserve prices Rm = m/2 for all m.
Proof sketch. We show that contract bi in DR-SCE is com-
pletely equivalent to contract j` where ` = 3bi/2 (i.e. same
behavior and same ex-post utility). This is by writing the
penalty function F (j`, X), and considering the realization of
Xi when: Xi < bi/2, Xi ∈ [bi/2, 3bi/2], and Xi > 3bi/2.
Then bidding bi is optimal in DR-SCE if and only if DR-VCG
assigns j` to i.
Proposition 6 has two important implications. First, tran-
sition from the currently used DR-SCE mechanism to DR-
VCG can be gradual and backward-compatible: we can still
allow bids on quantity (bi) and internally convert them to the
appropriate Cliff contract j` with reserve price 0.5`. Sec-
ond, it becomes obvious that DR-SCE is just a very restricted
version of the more general DR-VCG, where parameter val-
ues are arbitrary and most likely suboptimal. By setting
the proper reduction target and reserve prices, we expect DR-
VCG to outperform DR-SCE. In particular:
1. DR-SCE makes no informed selection. With an explicit
reduction goal M (based on the actual surge prediction),
DR-VCG selects agents who are more reliable. Thus
we expect that PV CG > PSCE in most cases.
2. DR-VCG pays rewards based on competition. In fact,
for JSCE and any M and S, TEV CG ≤ TESCE .
3. DR-VCG allows agents to bid on multiple contracts, so
they can reveal more information on their type.
4. DR-SCE uses arbitrary price of 0.5m for contracts of
size m, whereas DR-VCG is flexible. In particular we
may use the actual costs of generating m kWh, which
are highly non-linear due to the cost of adding another
generator.
Example 3. Consider the same 3 agents from Example 2.
In the DR-SCE mechanism, all agents will submit a bid of
bi = 100, and the grid cannot distinguish between them. If it
selects two of them at random, it pays TESCE = (50+45+
35) · 23 = 83.33—much more than TEV CG = 25.
If we compare failure probabilities, then P
SCE
= 130.1 +
1
30.3+
1
3 (1−0.9·0.7) = 0.224, whereas P
V CG
= 0.1, which
is again an improvement over SCE.
On the other hand, if agents have to invest high costs c∗i then
they might not participate in DR-SCE at all, as their reward
is bounded by $0.5. Thus DR-SCE pays too much to agents
with low c∗i , and too little to agents with high c
∗
i .
The parameters of the Cliff contract j` are also arbitrary
(e.g. why α = 13?), however there is no obvious way to set
them a-priori (see Discussion).
5.1 Simulations
Settings Each agent i has T “effort levels,” where each
level is a triple (cit, qit, pi), meaning that with investment
cit agent i can reduce qit kWh. The reduction succeeds
w.p. pi, and w.p. 1 − pi reduction is 0 due to an unex-
pected event. The expected demand surge is M , and the grid
uses a safety margin γ ≥ 1. For each mechanism we de-
note by TE = TE(S∗(N, J, γM)) the total expense, and by
P = P (S∗(N, J, γM),M) the reliability, i.e., the probabil-
ity that
∑
Xi > M when the mechanism collects contracts
for γM . We run both DR-SCE and DR-VCG mechanisms,
and measure TESCE , TEV CG, PSCE , and PV CG.
To set up a realistic scenario of a typical demand response
event, we used [Patterson et al., 2014] that summarize pre-
vious DR programs. We fix the expected demand surge
to M = 10MWh. In each economy we sample n agents
i.i.d., where each agent has T ∈ {1, 3, 5} effort levels. For
each agent i ∈ N and effort level t ≤ T : the capacity
(in kWh) is qit ∼ Zipf(1, 500) · 10; individual reliability
is pi ∼ U [0.7, 1]; and agents’ investment costs (in $) are
cit ∼ U [0.2, 1], multiplied by qi.4 Note that only agents with
maxt
cit
qit
≤ 0.5 will submit bids in DR-SCE. We generated
populations of 3 sizes: n = 100 (small), n = 200 (medium)
and n = 400 (large), and for each population varied the safety
margin between γ ∈ [1, 2].
We run simulations that demonstrate the four advantages of
the DR-VCG mechanism mentioned above. Every datapoint
in our simulations is an average over 100 instances.
Selection and Competition In our first simulation, agents
each have a single effort level (T = 1). We use the set of
4This roughly mimics the aggregate statistics in the data, where
agents’ bids are highly skewed, with a minimum of 10 kWh up to
several MWh, overall reliability is ∼ 0.85, and participation is low
(about 100 bidders out of 1000 registered users). We also tried dif-
ferent distributions and got similar results.
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Figure 2: Reliability vs. expense for large and medium pop-
ulations and single effort level.
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Figure 3: Reliability vs. expense with for medium population
n = 200, with multiple effort levels.
“SCE-like” contracts JSCE = {j`}`=10,20,..., and set linear
reserve prices Rm = 0.5m for all m ≥ 0. Thus for a single
bidder, DR-SCE and DR-VCG are equivalent by Prop. 6.
Fig. 2 shows the expense-vs.-reliability frontier under both
mechanisms. Larger safety margin γ results in more recruited
agents and higher reliability, but also higher costs. We can
see that in both populations DR-VCG dominates DR-SCE by
guaranteeing any reliability level at a much lower cost. We
found that even if we pay the reserve prices to all selected
agents, DR-VCG does somewhat better than DR-SCE, mean-
ing that it does indeed select better agents.
Fig. 2 also shows that the advantage of DR-VCG becomes
larger in large populations (or when the expected surge is
small), as competition drives prices down. In contrast, in
small populations DR-VCG and DR-SCE are the same, as
both exhaust all agents with low investment costs. Our next
simulations show how the other two advantages of DR-VCG
overcome this problem.
Multiple levels Fig. 3 shows the reliability frontier for a
medium population (n = 200) of agents with multiple ef-
fort levels. We can see from Figs. 2 and 3 that DR-VCG
performance becomes better as population gets larger and/or
agents’ types are more complex, wheres the performance of
DR-SCE remains almost the same. Intuitively, selecting from
n agents each submitting T independent bids is similar to se-
lecting from Tn agents, i.e. there is more competition.
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Figure 4: Outcomes under SCE and VCG mechanism for
small population (n = 100) and flexible reserve prices.
Flexible reserve prices The SCE contracts with their linear
reserve price do not reflect correctly the outside options avail-
able to the grid. In reality, the grid cannot generate additional
power at small quantities to fill the gaps between agents’ bids
and the reduction goal. Failure to reach the reduction goal
γM means that the grid cannot rely on the current DR con-
tracts, and must increase supply by operating another gen-
erator at a large cost. The operating cost with modern gas
turbines is $0.04 − 0.1 per kWh, but each turbine gener-
ates at least 100 MWh. We thus set the reserve prices to
Rm = 4000 + 0.1m, which creates a dichotomy between
“success” (where the DR mechanism collected enough con-
tracts to forgo the additional turbine) and “failure.” Increasing
the reserve prices also requires higher penalties. Otherwise
agents may bid for contracts they do not plan to keep, with
reward higher than the maximal penalty. We did not optimize
the contract (see Discussion) and instead just set the penalties
to f` = ` (double from j`).
Fig. 4 shows how flexible prices benefit DR-VCG in small
populations. As the target capacity γM increases, this re-
quires high reliability using a small population, which DR-
SCE very often fails to achieve. This is because it may not
find enough reliable agents willing to bid for a payment of
$0.5, and it must use the extra turbine for a high cost. In
contrast, DR-VCG can increase the reward to agents, thereby
attracting also bidders with investment costs higher than $0.5.
6 Discussion
We suggested in this paper the DR-VCG mechanism for
demand-response contracts that is based on individual “soft”
commitments and flexible penalty schemes. While the details
of the contracts and the analysis were specific to demand re-
sponse programs, the general idea of offering flexible penalty
contracts to multiple agents may be useful in other domains
that require joint effort under uncertainty [Porter et al., 2008].
We considered three natural parametric classes of penal-
ties that allow for efficient computation of VCG prices, and
showed how they generalize the currently deployed SCE con-
tract. Power companies can adopt the new DR-VCG mech-
anism with the SCE contracts for painless migration at first.
Then, they can gradually add more contracts and optimize
their parameters based on distributional assumptions, data on
consumption profiles, trial-and-error, and so on. Another ben-
efit of DR-VCG is that the grid can focus on optimizing the
set of contracts without worrying about agents’ strategic be-
havior, whereas agents can focus on accurately estimating
their costs for each contract. Based on initial simulations, it
seems that penalties should be higher than $0.5 per kWh, and
perhaps superlinear in the size of the contract (as reliability
of large consumers is more important). Finding optimal pa-
rameters under various assumptions is a major topic for future
research, as well as a better understanding of the connections
between reliability, penalties, and expenses.
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A Variants of DR mechanisms
Agent-side variant This variant is similar to the auction variant, only instead of bidding on some fixed set of contracts J , the
grid publishes a parametric penalty scheme F . Each agent submits a finite number of bids, where each bid contains a contract
j (i.e. its parameters) and a cost cij . For example, the grid publishes the fixed scheme f` = `/2 as above. Agent 1 submits two
bids, J1 = {(5, 8), (7, 10)} (i.e. the agent asks $8 to reduce consumption by 5 units, or $10 to reduce 7 units), agent 2 submits
the bids J2 = {(5, 6), (10, 12), (100, 20)}, and so on. The grid then runs the auction mechanism with J =
⋃
i∈N Ji.
This mechanism leaves the decision of what contracts to bid on for the agent, thereby allowing them to submit fewer bids on
goals that are convenient to them.
Direct revelation variant The grid publishes a parametric penalty scheme F , as in the agent-side variant. Then each agent
reports her entire cost function which maps every possible contract to a cost under F . For example, the grid may publish
the fixed penalty scheme f` = `/2. Then agents will submit their reported cost functions Ci(`) in some concise form. The
mechanism then chooses for each agent i a contract `∗i from the (infinite) set {(`, Ci(`))}`≥0 (and the null contract (0, 0)), such
that S∗(N) = {(i, `∗i )}i∈N minimizes the total cost
∑
i∈N Ci(`
∗
i ) among all valid contracts.
This version of the mechanism is the most demanding one: both for the agents who should come up with a function describing
their cost for any possible contract; and for the grid that has the burden of optimizing over an infinite set of contracts. On the
other hand, since the set of contracts in this version is the largest one, the outcome is better in terms of social cost.
B Proofs
B.1 Computational Complexity
Proposition 7. Checking whether SB∗(N, J) ≤ Z for some input N, J, Z is NP-hard, even when J includes only fixed
contracts.
Proof. Proof is by a reduction from the Knapsack problem [Karp, 1972]. Given a Knapsack instance {(vi, wi)}i∈N (volume,
worth), we define for each item i ∈ N a fixed contract ji = (wi, 1), and an agent i such that Bi,ji = vi and Bi,j =∞ for any
j 6= ji. Then SB∗(N, J) ≤ Z if and only if there is a set of items of total worth M that fit in a sack of size Z.
Theorem 1. For any sets of agents N and Cliff contracts J , both of S∗(N, J) and SB∗(N, J) (and thus also VCG prices) can
be computed in time polynomial in n, k,M .
Proof. We provide a dynamic program that decides in poly time whether SB∗(N, J) ≥ Z. We can then solve the optimization
problem by doing binary search on the value of Z.
Fix an arbitrary order over agents in N , and initialize tables S and SB, each of size (n+ 1)×M .
1. The cell S(0,m) is initialized to ∅ for 1 ≤ m ≤M .
2. The cell SB(0,m) is initialized to zero for m = 0 and to infinity for 1 ≤ m ≤M .
3. The cells S(k,m), SB(k,m) will contain the optimal subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , k} × J s.t. ∑(i,j)∈S `ij = m, and the sum of
bids in of S(k,m), respectively.
Given S(k − 1,m) for all m ≤ M , we can compute S(k,m) for all m ≤ M , by considering the best option to meet m
without agent k (SB(k− 1,m)), and all possible contracts of agent k, i.e. S(k− 1,m− `j)∪{(k, j)} for each j ∈ J . We take
the best solution from all |J |+ 1 options.
More formally, let
j∗ = argminj∈J SB(k − 1,m− `j) +Bk,j , s∗ = min
j∈J
SB(k − 1,m− `j) +Bk,j .
If s∗ ≥ SB(k − 1,m) then set S(k,m) = S(k − 1,m) and SB(k,m) = SB(k − 1,m). Otherwise, set S(k,m) =
S(k − 1,m− `j∗) ∪ {(k, j∗)} and SB(k,m) = SB(k − 1,m− `j∗) +Bk,j∗ .
Finally, We consider all feasible solutions (S(n,m) for m ≥M ) and select the one with the minimal cost SB(n,m) among
them.
B.2 Incentives
Theorem 2. Consider the auction variant of the DR-VCG mechanism.
1. For every contract j ∈ J , it is a dominant strategy for agent i to bid C∗i (j);
2. If contract (i, j) is selected, it is a dominant strategy for i to invest c∗i (j) in preparation;
3. The mechanism is IR.
Proof. First, suppose contract (i, j) was selected. Thus i’s expected utility for investing c is vi(c, j) = ri − c − Fi(j, c). By
definition, this is maximized by investing c∗i (j). Thus we can assume that agents indeed invest the effort on which they base
their overall true cost C∗i (j).
Let ij be an agent that attaches 0 cost to contract j, and infinite cost to all other contracts. It is easy to show that the
mechanism can be interpreted as follows:
• “cost-independent prices”: for each agent i and each contract j, the mechanism offers a payment:
tji = SB
∗(N−i)− SB∗−i(N−i ∪ {ij})
where SB∗−i(N−i ∪ {ij}) is the social cost on the rest of the agents, when agent i (or ij) gets contract j.
• “agent-maximizing selection”: each agent selects the utility-maximizing contract from the set of offered contracts, unless
all contracts yield negative utility.
To see why, suppose that i strictly prefers contract j′ over contract j. Then
tji − C∗i (j) < tj
′
i − C∗i (j′)
then
SB∗(N) = SB∗−i(N−i ∪ {ij}) + C∗i (j) = (SB∗(N−i)− tji ) + C∗i (j) = SB∗(N−i)− (tji − C∗i (j))
> SB∗(N−i)− (tj
′
i − C∗i (j′)) = SB∗−i(N−i ∪ {ij
′}) + C∗i (j′) = SB(S′),
That is, the mechanism would prefer an alternative assignment S′ where i is assigned to contract j′ rather than j. Since tji are
independent of agent i’s reported costs, it is a dominant strategy to report the true expected cost C∗i (j). It is left to show that
the mechanism is IR, i.e. that agent i selects a contract only if this guarantees a nonnegative utility.
• If (i, j) ∈ S∗(N), SB∗(N−i) ≥ SB∗(N) must hold. Therefore,
tji − C∗i (j) = SB∗(N−i)− SB∗−i(N−i ∪ {ij})− C∗i (j) = SB∗(N−i)− SB∗(N) ≥ 0.
• If i /∈ S∗(N), then SB∗(N−i) = SB∗−i(N), thus for all j ∈ J , tji − C∗i (j) = 0− C∗i (j) ≤ 0.
The theorem has the following corollaries on the other two variants we presented:
1. The direct revelation mechanism is truthful, as it is a dominant strategy for an agent to report her full cost type. This is
simply by considering J as the set of all contracts.
2. For the agent-side variant, we do not specify how the agent selects on which contracts to bid: indeed, there may not be a
dominant strategy for an agent to select contracts. Yet on any set of reported contracts, the agent will bid her true costs,
and the mechanism will select the optimal subset from all reported contracts. To see why, just suppose that the agent first
suggests the set of contracts to the grid, and then the grid includes them in the published set J .
B.3 Reliability Guarantees
Proposition 5. Suppose that the set of possible contracts J is composed of cliff penalty contracts of the form (`j , f, α, βj) for
some fixed f and α (same for all contracts), then P (S, α ·M) ≤ 1f SB(S). This bound is tight.
Proof.
SB(S) =
∑
(i,j)∈S
C∗i (j) =
∑
(i,j)∈S
c∗i (j) +
∑
(i,j)∈S
E[Fi(j)]
≥
∑
(i,j)∈S
E[Fi(j)] ≥
∑
(i,j)∈S
f`j · Pr(Xi < αj`j)
For fixed f` = f and αj = α,
= f ·
∑
(i,j)∈S
·Pr(Xi < α`j) ≥ f · Pr(
∑
(i,j)∈S
Xi < α
∑
(i,j)∈S
`j)
≥ f · Pr(
∑
(i,j)∈S
Xi < αM),
B.4 DR-SCE implemented by DR-VCG
For any ` > 0, we define a cliff contract j` = (`, f` = `2 , α =
1
3 , β =
1
2 ).
Proposition 6. For any agent i of type pi, submitting optimal bid bi to the DR-SCE mechanism is ex-post equivalent to being
the only bidder in DR-VCG with M ≥ bi, JSCE= {j`}`≥0, and reserve prices Rm = m/2 for all m.
Proof. The reward to the agent for contract j` is determined by the reserve cost, thus ri = R` = `/2. The penalty function
F˜ has the following form: F˜ (j`, X) =
{
`/2, X < `/3
(`−X)/2, `/3 ≤ X < `
0, ` ≤ X
For any bid b, we identify a corresponding contract
j = j(b), such that `j = 3b2 (the argument b is omitted when clear from context). We will show that for any realization of Xi,
the utility of i is the same under the DR-SCE (with bid bi) and under the DR-VCG mechanism with the truthful bid C∗i (j) on
contract j = j(b). Denote by rSCEi (b,X) the realized reward to an agent in the SCE mechanism that bids b and reduces X .
Note that there are 3 cases:
1. If Xi < bi/2 then rSCEi (bi, Xi) = 0. In this case it also holds that Xi <
3bi
3·2 =
`j
3 , and thus the penalty is F (j(bi), Xi) =
`j/2. Thus the reward minus penalty in DR-VCG is ri − F (j(bi), Xi) = `j/2− `j/2 = 0 = rSCEi (bi, Xi).
2. If bi/2 ≤ Xi < 3bi/2, then rSCEi (bi, Xi) = Xi/2. In this case `j/3 ≤ Xi < `j so the total payment is ri − F˜ (j,Xi) =
`j/2− (`j −Xi)/2 = Xi/2 = rSCEi (bi, Xi).
3. If 3bi/2 ≤ Xi, then rSCEi (bi, Xi) = 3bi/4. In this case `j ≤ Xi so the total payment is ri − F (j,Xi) = `j/2 − 0 =
3bi/4 = r
SCE
i (bi, Xi).
If there is a preparation cost, it is the same cost under both mechanisms, thus in either case the outcome is completely
equivalent.
It is left to show that under both mechanisms agent i ends up with the same contract. In the DR-SCE mechanism, the bidder
selects b∗i which maximizes
E[rSCEi (b,X)]− c∗ib = E[ri − F (j,X)]− c∗i (j) = `j/2− (E[F (j,X)] + c∗i (j)).
DR-VCG, on the other hand, minimizes the sum of bids that reach M , where the gap between the unique selected contract `j
and M is filled by the reserve. I.e. S∗ = {(i, j∗)}, where
j∗ = argminj{C∗i (j) +RM−`j} = argminj{E[F (j,X)] + c∗i (j) +RM−`j}
= argminj{E[F (j,X)] + c∗i (j) +
M − `j
2
} = argminj{E[F (j,X)] + c∗i (j)−
`j
2
},
which is the same as argmaxj{`j/2− (E[F (j,X)] + c∗i (j))}. Thus j∗ = j(b∗i ). In other words, the contract j∗ assigned to i
in DR-VCG is exactly the one corresponding to bid b∗i in the DR-SCE mechanism.
As we showed that every SCE contract has an equivalent contract that can be oferred by DR-VCG, we denote this set of
contracts by JSCE . Consider some assignment S of contracts to agents.
Proposition 8. For any subset of contracts S ⊆ N × JSCE , with Rm = m/2 for all m. Then TEV CG(S) ≤ TESCE(S).
Proof. Note that an agent i assigned to contract j will invest the same effort c∗i (j) under both mechanisms, and hence will have
the same reduction in expectation (and even ex-post). Denote by EFi = EXi∼pi(c∗i (j))[F (j,Xi)] the expected penalty of agent
i in DR-VCG.
Each agent i assigned to contract j` earns f`−EFi in DR-SCE. The same agent in DR-VCG earns ri−EFi ≤ `/2−EFi =
f` − EFi.
As the total expense in each mechanism is the sum of payments, DR-SCE pays weakly more.
We highlight that the proposition does not entail that DR-VCG always pays less. This is since for the same population,
DR-SCE and DR-VCG may assign different sets of contracts.
C A Numeric Example with continuous intervals
To demonstrate both our mechanism and its advantage over the current system, we consider a simple numeric example with
only two agents (and no preparation costs). We only present some details here, and the rest can be found in Appendix C.1.
Suppose there are two agents with the following capacity distributions at cost 0: X1 ∼ U [100, 200] and X2 ∼ U [50, 250].
Thus both agents have the same capacity in expectation but agent 1 is more reliable. The goal of the grid is to cut M = 150
KW.
Let us consider first agents’ bids under the DR-SCE mechanism (recall that the price is $0.5 per KW). The dominant strategy
for agent 1 is to bid anything s.t. [100, 200] ⊆ [b1/2, 3b1/2], thus say b1 = 150. For agent 2 bidding b2 = 150 is unique. The
expected reward to agent 1 will be r1 = 0.5
∫ 200
X=100
X 1100dX = 75 (0.5$ times the expected capacity). For agent 2, note that
b2/2 = 75, 3b2/2 = 225, thus r2 = 0.5
∫ 225
X=75
X 1200dX + 0.5
∫ 250
X=225
225 1200dX
∼= 70.3. Therefore, if the grid takes both
contracts, it pays about $145.3 in expectation. The grid may also choose to assign a single contract and reduce the expense
to $70 − 75, however this means that the reduction goal of M = 150 is only met w.p. of 50% (regardless of which agent is
selected).
Next, suppose that the grid uses the DR-VCG mechanism. Available contracts are cliff contracts with the SCE penalty
scheme, i.e. for each `, a contract of the form (`, f` = `2 , α =
1
3 , β =
1
2 ). Thus the expected penalty (and thus cost) for an
agent i on contract j` is C∗i (`) =
∫ `/3
X=0
`
2pi(X)dX +
∫ `
X=`/3
`−X
2 pi(X)dX . For example, for agent 1,
C∗1 (`) =

0 , ` ≤ 100
(`−100)2
200 , 100 ≤ ` ≤ 200≥ 50 , 200 ≤ `
Suppose for simplicity that contracts are available only on multiples of 50 kW. Then agents report the following costs:
`i 0 50 100 150
C∗1 0 0 0 12.5
C∗2 0 0 6.25 25
Note that agent 2 reports higher costs, because he is less reliable and thus expects higher penalties. The cheapest combination
of contracts for the grid is to assign 100 units to agent 1, and 50 units to agent 2. This will result in rewards of r1 = C∗2 (150)−
C∗2 (50) = 25−0 = 25, and r2 = C∗1 (150)−C∗1 (100) = 12.5−0 = 12.5. Thus the total expense for the grid is 25+12.5 = 37.5,
which is less than what the DR-SCE mechanism pays a single agent.
In this example, the agents always meet the reduction goal. In the appendix, we show how payments and reliability vary
under both mechanisms as we increase the reduction goal M .
C.1 A Numeric Example expanded
To demonstrate both our mechanism and its advantage over the current system, we consider a simple numeric example with
only two agents (and no preparation costs), varying the reduction goal.
Two agents with a linear penalty scheme Suppose there are two agents with the following capacity distributions at cost 0:
X1 ∼ U [100, 200] and X2 ∼ U [50, 250]. Thus both agents have the same capacity in expectation but agent 1 is more reliable.
For the power company, λ = 0 and Cm = m for any m. Available contracts are cliff contracts of the form (`, f` = 0, α =
0, β = 1), which are simply linear penalties for hitting below the goal: F (`,X) = [` −X]+. Thus the expected penalty (and
thus cost) for an agent reporting `i is C∗i (`i) =
∫ `i
X=0
(`i −X)pi(X)dX .
For agent 1,
C∗1 (`1) =

0 , `1 ≤ 100
(`1−100)2
200 , 100 ≤ `1 ≤ 200
`1 − 150 , 200 ≤ `1
For agent 2,
C∗2 (`2) =

0 , `2 ≤ 50
(`2−50)2
400 , 50 ≤ `2 ≤ 250
`2 − 150 , 250 ≤ `2
Suppose for simplicity that agents only bid in multiples of 50. Then they report the following costs:
`i 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
C∗1 0 0 0 12.5 50 100 150 200
C∗2 0 0 6.25 25 56.25 100 150 200
Cm 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175
We get the following solution for increasing values of M : The grid expense is the total reward paid, plus the cost of the
outside option, minus the penalties paid by the agents (note that since is no preparation cost, the sum of expected penalties
equals the social cost). The success probabilities are computed under the assumption that Xi are independent.
We can see that the best thing for the grid is to let each agent commit to up to 150 units, where more units go the more
reliable agent 1. When this is exhausted the grid uses its outside option to complete the missing power. We can see that the total
cost for the grid (rewards + outside option) is always at most CM , and substantially lower for small M . What if use the current
penalty scheme rather than linear penalties? since the agents never commit to more than `i = 150, and Xo ≥ 50 ≥ `i/3, the
current penalty scheme would never hit the ‘cliff’ and hence for this instance it would give identical outcome.
M 50 100 150 200 250 300 400 1000
S(N, J) {1} {1} {1, 2} {1, 2} {1, 2} {1, 2} {1, 2}+ 100 {1, 2}+ 700
SC(N, J) 0 0 0 6.25 18.75 37.5 87.5 387.5
`1 50 100 100 100 150 150 150 150
`2 − − 50 100 100 150 150 150
r1 0 6.25 25 50− 6.25 75− 6.25 100− 25 150− 75 75
= 43.75 = 68.75 = 75 = 75
r2 − − 12.5 37.5 62.5− 12.5 87.5− 12.5 137.5− 62.5 75
= 50 = 75 = 75
r1 + r2 + C 0 6.25 37.5 81.25 118.75 150 150 + 50 150 + 350
E[grid expense] 0 6.25 37.5 75 100 112.5 162.5 462.5
Pr(
∑
Xi ≥M) 1 1 1 0.94 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5
Pr(
∑
Xi ≥ 34M) 1 1 1 1 0.96 0.86 0.94 1
Pr(
∑
Xi ≥ 12M) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 1: Each column shows the results for a different reduction goal between 50 and 1000. The rows show: the selected set
(+additional production); the social cost; the individual reduction commitments; the rewards to selected agents; the total grid
expense (total rewards + external cost - expected penalties); and the probability to meet the reduction goal or part of it.
M 50 100 150 200 250 300 400 1000
|S| 1 1 1 2 2 2 2(+100) 2(+700)
E[grid expense] 72.5 72.5 72.5 145 145 145 195 495
Pr(
∑
Xi ≥M) 1 0.875 0.5 0.94 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5
Pr(
∑
Xi ≥ 34M) 1 0.937 0.78 1 0.96 0.86 0.94 1
Pr(
∑
Xi ≥ 12M) 1 1 0.937 1 1 1 1 1
Table 2: Outcome of the current PG&E mechanism for various reduction goals.
In contrast, suppose that the grid uses the DR-SCE mechanism. The dominant strategy for agent 1 is to bid anything s.t.
[100, 200] ⊆ [b1/2, 3b1/2], thus say b1 = 150, and for agent 2 b2 = 150 is unique. The expected reward to each selected agent
will be r1 = 75 (0.5$ times the expected capacity) and r2 ≡ 70. Suppose the grid selects agents at random until it meets the
reduction goal M and only then uses its outside option.5 We can see that the current mechanism is always at least as expensive
to the grid as using our proposed mechanism with the current penalty scheme, and the difference is substantial for M ≤ 400.
For M ≤ 150 the current mechanism is also less reliable, since it relies on a single agent while our mechanism signs contracts
with both agents (and at a lower cost). Note that this improvement is attained without modifying or optimizing the penalty
scheme.
When M is very high then both mechanisms rely mainly on the outside option and thus there is not much difference between
them.
5The current system in fact recruits all agents regardless of the reduction goal so is even less efficient.
